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their position is that in many cases inductive reasoning and
semantic cognition are just different names for the same thing.
However, in our view, although knowledge is very important to
an understanding of thinking, there are limits to what can be
explained by recourse to knowledge and the processes by which
it is attained. First, we will describe some effects, our own and
other people’s, which appear to challenge accounts that equate
thinking with semantic cognition. Then we will speculate as to
what kinds of account might best capture those effects.
The literature on deductive reasoning contains the clearest
evidence that there is more to thinking than semantic cognition.
For example, Handley et al. (2004) used a belief bias task where
10-year-old participants were asked to reason about arguments
the validity and believability of whose conclusions had been
orthogonally manipulated. Participants also completed measures
of inhibitory control and working memory. Successful perform-
ance on this task calls for the inhibition of outputs from semantic
cognition, and Handley et al. observed that inhibitory control and
working memory were independent predictors of the ability to
respond in accord with logical validity.
Of course, R&M make no claims about deduction. However,
some of our own work asks whether inductive reasoning can be
wholly captured by fast and parallel knowledge-based processes
or whether slow, resource-demanding processes also play a
role. For example, Feeney (2007) studied inductive projection
using arguments with multiple premises. Such arguments can
be used to study whether people are sensitive to diversity and
amount of evidence when evaluating inductive arguments, and
sensitivity to these phenomena has been modelled in wholly simi-
larity-based ways (Osherson et al. 1990; Sloman 1993). Feeney
showed that a measure of IQ is associated with people’s sensitivity
to these principles. The results are complex, but particularly in
the case of diversity, those participants who scored highest on
the IQ test tended to be most sensitive to the diversity of the pre-
mises. One interpretation of correlations between IQ and per-
formance on particular thinking tasks is that they indicate the
involvement of slow, symbol-manipulating processes in thinking
(see Stanovich 1999). That is, inductive reasoning is more than
semantic cognition, and is based on more than processes that
allow for the calculation of similarity between representations.
A related ﬁnding concerns when sensitivity to properties of the
premises of an inductive argument develops. Wilburn and Feeney
(2007) have shown that sensitivity to diversity begins to emerge at
age 7, whereas sensitivity to amount of evidence does not begin to
emerge until age 13. We interpret this ﬁnding as suggesting that in
a category-based inductive argument, sensitivity to amount of evi-
dence requires the reasoner to know that larger samples make for
sounder inferences, whereas sensitivity to diversity can be demon-
strated on the basis of similarity calculations alone. This ﬁnding
also suggests that there is more to thinking than mere similarity.
Like R&M (Semantic Cognition, Ch. 8), we have also been
concerned with the effects of knowledge about causal relations
on inductive generalisation. A particularly interesting case
comes from Medin et al. (2003), who demonstrated the cat-
egory-based conjunction fallacy. They compared strength
ratings for the following argument:
Lead has Property X, therefore pipes and plumbers have Property X
to the mean strength ratings for the causally near generalisation
from lead to pipes and to the causally distant generalisation from
lead to plumbers. (We term lead and pipes causally distant
because the reasoner has to infer the involvement of pipes to
explain the transmission of Property X from lead to plumbers.)
Medin et al. (2003) demonstrated that, on average, people
commit the conjunction fallacy. That is, the strength rating for
the argument with the conjunctive conclusion is higher than
the average strength rating for other two arguments.
Feeney et al., (2007) followed up on this ﬁnding and showed
that the near generalisation from lead to pipes is rated strongest,
whereas the distant generalisation from pipes to plumbers is
rated weakest. In addition, we found that participants highest
in IQ were more likely to rate the near generalisation stronger
than the conjunctive argument. In further follow-up experiments
(Crisp et al., under review) we asked participants to concur-
rently perform a working memory task whilst rating generalis-
ation strength. The secondary task increased rates of the
conjunction fallacy observed when ratings for the conjunctive
argument were compared to the distant case, but not when com-
pared to the near case. Our interpretation of these ﬁndings is that
in the distant case, people resisted the conjunction fallacy
because they explicitly reasoned about causal relations and
reconstructed the causal chain linking, for example, lead to plum-
bers. Having reconstructed the causal chain, they assigned
equally high-strength ratings to distant and conjunctive argu-
ments. A concurrent task impeded their ability to engage in
this causal reasoning in the distant case, whereas it had no
effect in the near case because the stronger causal relation was
immediately available. The same basic pattern was obtained
when participants were encouraged to answer quickly. Thus,
the individual differences, secondary task, and speeded task
data suggest that some effects of knowledge on thinking are mod-
erated by processes that are associated with IQ and working
memory, and which take time.
Our preferred explanation for these ﬁndings is that there are at
least two types of thinking (see Evans 2006; Sloman 1996; Stano-
vich 1999), a fast and associative form of thinking, and a slower
and sequential type of thinking. The ﬁrst type of thinking per-
forms, among other operations, similarity calculations, whereas
the second type applies rules and makes some (but not all) infer-
ences about causal relations. It has been studied by researchers
interested in models (Johnson-Laird 2006), rules (Rips 1994),
or simulations (Evans & Over 2004) for reasoning. R&M’s
models of semantic cognition appear more relevant to the ﬁrst
type of thinking than they do to the second.
Impressed as we are by R&M’s book, we cannot see how their
current models can capture our data. Of course, R&M have antici-
pated our concerns and questions (see Semantic Cognition,
pp. 371–73), but it may take another book to convince us of their
answer.
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Abstract: Three issues are raised in this commentary. First, the mapping
of semantic information into the different layers could be done in a more
realistic way by using the Context layer to represent situational contexts.
Second, a way to differentiate category membership information from
other property information needs to be considered. Finally, the issue of
modal knowledge is raised.
The parallel distributed processing (PDP) approach to modeling
cognition has provided a healthy redress of the balance between
empiricist and rationalist accounts of human thought. Following
Chomsky’s demolition of behaviorist theories of thought and
language, it was assumed for many years that the mind was a
symbol-processing machine, following algorithmic, syntactic
rules to solve problems, achieve goals, and so forth. The
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discovery that PDP networks can behave in systematic rule-fol-
lowing ways has been matched by growing evidence that in
many important respects our psychological processes are also
only approximately rule-governed, so that a felicitous marrying
of model and data has been achieved. In Semantic Cognition,
Rogers and McClelland (2004) show how the Rumelhart model
can learn to accurately associate properties with their respective
noun concepts, while at the same time showing the general inﬂu-
ence of the similarity structure of the knowledge being rep-
resented. Just as Rosch (1978) proposed, the mind is sensitive
to the correlational structure of the world and the concepts we
learn correspond to the complex covariation of different proper-
ties across semantic domains. The Rumelhart model provides the
missing mechanism for how this arises, while at the same time
modeling a wide range of now familiar prototype effects such
as basic levels, typicality and category-based induction.
As presented, the model does not aim to represent the actual
contents of anyone’s semantic memory, and so there is still
much detail to explore and develop. The following comments
are suggestions about directions in which the model could use-
fully be taken, both to demonstrate its explanatory power and
test its limits.
Use of the Context Relation layer. The Context or Relation
layer is currently used to determine the type of relation
between the noun concept (e.g., pine) and a property (e.g., ISA
tree, CAN grow, IS tall). This use of the Context layer appears
arbitrary and could lead to difﬁculties in a more realistic concep-
tual domain. The Context layer is clearly a vital part of the archi-
tecture of the model and cannot be omitted. But perhaps the
Context layer might more usefully encode just that – context.
Barsalou (2003) has reviewed evidence that the properties gener-
ated to a noun concept relate to an imagined situational con-
text – so that, for example, very different properties would be
generated for a car seen in a parking lot versus a car from the
point of view of a driver. Typicality structure can also be highly
context dependent (Barsalou 1987; Roth & Shoben 1983).
Output property units could then encode whole properties (can
grow, is tall) undifferentiated by their syntax. Syntactic form is
a poor guide to the relatedness of properties. In the model
most of the “is” relations were visually based. But in real life an
“is” relation can encode any number of non-perceptual and
abstract properties such as is valuable, is annoying, or is bad
for your health. Grouping properties by syntax may not corre-
spond to any real-world structure. An alternative suggestion to
try here would be to use the Context layer to input the type of
property (part, appearance, function, behavior, origin, etc.)
using semantic rather than syntactic criteria to determine types.
Category information is not just another property. Categorical
ISA relations have traditionally been treated very differently in
studies of semantic memory from other properties. Knowing
the category membership of an item will normally provide a
much broader range of useful inferences about it than will knowl-
edge of a salient property. The ISA relation captures the kind of
thing that the item is, whereas properties just capture a particular
property. Category information is also veriﬁed more rapidly
(Hampton 1984). The model does not reﬂect this difference
structurally, although it is notable that all of the input items
reappear as ISA output units. How could the model be asked
whether it had learned the properties of superordinate categor-
ies – for example, that trees have roots or that ﬁsh have gills?
Quantiﬁcation and modality. A difﬁculty for any similarity-
based model is the handling of extensional reasoning and quanti-
ﬁed statements. When it has mastered its knowledge domain, the
model will correctly verify that a robin is a robin, a robin is a bird,
and a robin is red. It will not be able to explain, however, that a
robin is a robin is tautologically true, a robin is a bird is necess-
arily true (assuming that any non-bird could never resemble a
robin sufﬁciently to belong in that class), whereas a robin is red
is generically true – only being true of most adult robins (or in
Europe only of adult males). Knowledge of what actually exists
is not primarily the job of semantic memory, but the model
clearly lacks a way to handle truth under different quantiﬁers.
Failure to consider the truth of statements extensionally is
quite possibly an advantage of the model given that people are
also bad at it, and succumb to similarity-based “non-logical”
effects when reasoning about category membership (e.g.,
Hampton 1982; Jo¨nsson & Hampton 2006). But it would be
worth exploring whether the model can learn the difference
between properties that are necessarily true and those that are
typically true.
The reverse side of the coin is whether the model can deter-
mine which properties can be expected to co-occur and which
may not. Suppose that backpropagation to representation is
used to ﬁnd a representation of an item that is large and
yellow, and has petals, as opposed to an item that has roots,
gills, and feathers. Can it be demonstrated that some represen-
tations are found rapidly and with low residual error (even
although the properties have not co-occurred in the training
set), whereas others are impossible to represent without a high
degree of error. Modal intuitions of necessity and possibility
(Rips 2001) are an important aspect of semantic cognition, and
it would be a bonus for the research program to show how the
network can also match such intuitions.
Structured models of semantic cognition
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Abstract: Rogers & McClelland (R&M) criticize models that rely on
structured representations such as categories, taxonomic hierarchies,
and schemata, but we suggest that structured models can account for
many of the phenomena that they describe. Structured approaches and
parallel distributed processing (PDP) approaches operate at different
levels of analysis, and may ultimately be compatible, but structured
models seem more likely to offer immediate insight into many of the
issues that R&M discuss.
It is widely accepted that cognition can be understood at multiple
levels of analysis, but there are different claims about the nature
of these levels (Broadbent 1985; Marcus 2001; Rumelhart &
McClelland 1985; Smolensky 1988). In Semantic Cognition
(2004), Rogers & McClelland (R&M) appear to suggest that par-
allel distributed processing (PDP) approaches and structured
approaches lead to proposals at the same level of analysis, and
are therefore competitors. Like some previous researchers
(Smolensky 1988), we believe that these two paradigms are com-
patible, and that they aim for explanations at different levels of
analysis.
Since R&M treat structured approaches as the competition,
they naturally emphasize the problems they see with structured
models of cognition. Among other criticisms, they suggest that
structured approaches cannot capture typicality, exceptions,
and the graded inferences that are characteristic of human learn-
ing (Semantic Cognition, p. 44); that there are few attempts to
explain how taxonomic hierarchies might be acquired (pp. 13,
31); and that structured approaches do not explain why people
make very different inferences when reasoning about different
kinds of properties (e.g., “has cold blood” vs. “weighs ten tons,”
p. 34).
If PDP approaches and structured approaches operate at
different levels of analysis, then many phenomena (e.g., graded
inferences and learning) will turn out to be compatible with
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